Michigan Law Review
Volume 62

Issue 4

1964

A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure
Robert L. Knauss
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal History Commons, and the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert L. Knauss, A Reappraisal of the Role of Disclosure, 62 MICH. L. REV. 607 (1964).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol62/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

A REAPPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF DISCLOSURE
Robert L. Knauss*

T

Report of Special Study of Securities Markets 1 contains
the following statements on the role of disclosure:

HE

"The keystone of the entire structure of Federal securities
legislation is disclosure." 2
"The Commission's functions and responsibilities under
the two basic securities laws are broadly of two types: first,
to preside over the processes of disclosure, especially by
issuers of securities, upon which these laws so basically rely;
and second, to regulate substantive conduct in the securities
market, both directly, and by supervision of industry selfregulation. " 3
These statements should be compared with that found in the
leading textbook on securities regulation: "Then too, there is the
recurrent theme throughout these statutes of disclosure, again
disclosure, and still more disclosure." 4
Disclosure, however, is not a simple method of regulation
having universal application and universal effectiveness. It assumes a different role and meaning depending on the information
to be disclosed, the party on whom the obligation of disclosure
rests, and the parties for whom the information is intended. The
objective of this paper is to assess the current role of disclosure
in its various aspects in security regulation. Following a brief
description of the current uses of disclosure in securities regulation, there are separate sections describing and evaluating (I) the
obligation of disclosure imposed on issuers at the initial sale of
securities, (2) the obligation of disclosure resting on issuers if they
have securities which are traded, and (3) obligations of disclosure
imposed on parties in the securities business other than issuers.
This last section includes obligations of insiders, broker-dealers,
and investment advisers, as well as duties of exchanges and overthe-counter dealers to provide market data. A concluding section
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. Professor Knauss was a member of the Special Study of Securities Markets and is currently a Legal Consultant to the
Securities and Exchange Commission.-Ed. The views expressed herein are those of the
author, do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission, and except where specific
reference is made do not reflect the findings or recommendations of the Special Study.
1 Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and Exchange Commission, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special Study].
2 Special Study pt. 3, at I.
8 Special Study pt. 4, at 719.
4 I Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 21 (2d ed. 1961).
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discusses briefly the broader function of disclosure as a device to
control internal corporate affairs.

I.

THE VARIOUS ROLES OF DISCLOSURE IN SECURITIES
REGULATION

The objective of the Securities Act of 19335-the "truth in
securities" bill-was to require that any company selling securities
to the public disclose factual data concerning the company. The
requirements of disclosure are imposed on the selling companies
and parties such as underwriters who sell on behalf of the company. The nature of the disclosure is that of a seller to a buyer.
President Roosevelt stated in his message to Congress of March
29, 1933: "This proposal adds to the ancient rule of caveat emptor,
the further doctrine 'let the seller also beware.' It puts the burden
of telling the whole truth on the seller." 6
Following the initial distribution and sale by the company,
there is a change in the basis of the obligation of the company to
disclose. When one investor sells securities to another through
the facilities of an exchange or in the over-the-counter market, the
company is not a part of the transaction, and receives no direct
benefit. The Securities Exchange Act of 19347 provides that companies the securities of which are listed on a national exchange
must submit annual financial statements and other periodic reports. 8 In addition, such companies must meet requirements established by the Commission for the solicitation of proxies.9 These
obligations do not arise from a buyer-seller relationship, but represent a continuing respon.sibility of the company as long as its
securities are traded on a national exchange. An aspect related to
the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act is the rule of
most exchanges requiring that the exchange (and thus the public)
be informed immediately of any unusual corporate activity.10
These obligations of disclosure just mentioned rest on the
company-the issuer of the securities and parties acting in its
behalf.11 A broad and growing area of disclosure remains: the
5 48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as
Securities Act].
6 Quoted in H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
7 48 Stat. 881 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963) [hereinafter cited as
Exchange Act].
s See the Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 48 Stat. 892, 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 781, 78m (1958).
9 Exchange Act § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958).
10 See NEW YORK. STOCK EXCHANGE, COMPANY MANUAL A20-22 (1953).
11 Under the Securities Act the obligation of disclosure in the initial distribution rests
not only on the issuer, but also on individual officers and directors of the issuer and
those held to be underwriters selling on behalf of the issuer.

1964]

DISCLOSURE

609

requirements applicable to various participants in the securities
business other than the issuer. Some of the requirements are expressly delineated by statute, and others have been formulated by
Commission decision and regulations. It is in this area that the
greatest growth in the role of disclosure is taking place. The Exchange Act imposes a positive requirement that all officers, directors, and those holding ten percent of the outstanding stock in a
listed company disclose all trades which they make of the company's stock.12 This is an individual duty of each party as to every
purchase or sale.
There are also various disclosures required for other parties
who purchase and sell securities. The anti-fraud provisions of the
Exchange Act compel positive disclosure by all purchasers and
sellers to an extent beyond that needed to avoid a common-law
action of fraud. 13 As the involvement of the party increases, his
obligations increase. For example, a duty is imposed on a brokerdealer to disclose the manner in which a transaction is executed,14
as well as the existence of conflicts of interest arising because he
has a direct interest in the security he is selling. Recent decisions,
and the recommendations of the Special Study go farther and
would impose a positive duty of disclosure in numerous other
instances.
Other participants in the securities markets, not involved directly in purchasing or selling, such as investment advisers, have
been under pressure to make disclosure similar to that of brokerdealers. The Commission has declared it fraudulent for an investment adviser not to disclose the fact he has taken a position in
securities he recommends.15 Developing areas concern the need for
the investment adviser to disclose the nature of his investigation
and research, and the source of his information. Similar requirements of disclosure are in the developmental stage for corporate
public relations men and others, such as magazine and newspaper
editors, who are responsible for the appearance of financial information concerning a company.
A remaining aspect of disclosure involves the market-place
itself. The exchanges have a responsibility to maintain accurate
Exchange Act § 16(a), 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1958).
See text accompanying note 106 infra for duties of sellers and purchasers under the
anti-fraud provisions.
H See text accompanying note 101 infra for duties of broker-dealers under the antifraud provisions.
15 See text accompanying notes 138-44 infra for a delineation of the duties of investment advisers and public relations men.
12
13
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reporting of current sales and volume of trading. 16 One of the
goals of the future development of the over-the-counter market is
to provide current market data similar to that available for securities traded on exchanges.
The disclosure obligations of participants in the securities industry are a part of a larger regulatory pattern which has numerous
direct restrictions and prohibitions. It is in these areas of restrictive control that "self-regulation" plays an important role. With
regard to the issuers of securities, disclosure is the exclusive
method of control.

II.

DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON ISSUERS IN THE
INITIAL SALE OF SECURITIES

Because of the nature of securities, a buyer cannot make an
immediate value judgment, as he would with tangible items. He
must look behind the piece of paper and examine the merits of
the company which has issued the security. The buyer must of
necessity rely on the information given to him and on material
generally available from the company. The less information
available, the less the market price will be representative of the
security's true value and the greater will be the opportunity for
fraud. 17 The need for governmental regulation stems from this
problem. The obligation of issuers of new securities to disclose
financial and other data as required by the Securities Act of 1933
originated largely in the English Company Acts. This obligation
and its active enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission performs an invaluable function. Disclosure requirements
alone, however, cannot protect investors in new securities from
loss, and it should be recognized that serious problems remain in
spite of the relative success of the Securities Act. A short description of these disclosure requirements and their background will
permit a better understanding of the unsolved problems.
A. History of the Issuance Requirements
The English law recognized at an early point that some control was needed over companies selling securities to the public.
The initial effort was the Bubble Act of 1719,18 which was enacted
16

See text accompanying notes 145 &: 146 infra, relating to the reporting of market

data.
17 One of the first statements of this view appears in Twycross v. Grant, [1877] 2
C.P. 469, 532. Similar language appears in Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917),
which upheld a regulatory Blue Sky Law.
18 6 Geo. 1, c. 18.
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following the spectacular stock frauds revealed in the bursting of
the South Sea Bubble. 19 This act was definitely regulatory, as it
in effect prohibited joint-stock companies (corporations) altogether. The prohibition proved unworkable. After several
weakening amendments the act was completely repealed in 1825.20
Stock frauds continued, and in response to public demand, the
Gladstone Committee, first of several English committees to
study the securities markets during the past 177 years,21 was appointed in 1841 "to inquire into the laws respecting joint-stock
companies with a view to the greater security of the public." 22
The company act23 which followed the Gladstone Committee
report was the real beginning of English corporation law; it had
two basic objectives: (I) to obviate the evils of fraudulent and
fictitious companies and (2) to protect the public from companies
which, while not founded in fraud, were faulty in their nature
because of unsound calculations and inadequate management.
The answer to both problems, according to Gladstone, was to
compel disclosure: "Publicity is all that is necessary. Show up the
roguery and it is harmless." 24 The mechanics to achieve this
publicity were elementary in scope. All that was required was
10 Parton, Caricature in the Hogarthian Period, Harper's New Monthly Magazine,
June-Nov. 1875, p. 40, states that "besides the original South Sea Company which began
the frenzy, there were started in the course of a few months about two hundred jointstock schemes, many of which, as given in Anderson's History of Commerce, are of almost
incredible absurdity. The sum called for by these projects was three hundred millions of
pounds sterling, which was more than the value of all the land in Great Britain. Shares
in Sir Richard Steele's 'fish pool for bringing fresh fish to London' brought one hundred
and sixty pounds a share! Men paid seventy pounds each for 'permits,' which gave them
merely the privilege of subscribing to a sail-cloth manufacturing company not yet
formed. There was, indeed, a great trade in 'permits' to subscribe to companies only
planned. • • • The prices paid for shares during the half year of this mania were as
remarkable as the schemes themselves. South Sea shares of a hundred pounds ·par value
reached a thousand pounds. It was a poor share that did not sell at five times its original
price. As in France, so in England, the long heads, like Sir Robert Walpole and Alexander
Pope, began to think of 'realizing' when they had gained a thousand per cenL or so upon
their ventures; and, in a very few days, realizing, in its tum, became a mania; and all
those paper fortunes shrank and crumpled into nothingness."
20 Companies Act, 1825, 6 Geo. 6, c. 91.
21 The other committees formed to study the securities markets were (1) The Royal
Commission of 1854 (Rickard's Report); (2) Lord Doney's Committee (1895); (3) Lovebum's Committee (1906); (4) Greene's Committee (1926); (5) the Bodkin Committee
(1937); (6) GREAT BRITAIN BOARD OF TRADE, REPORT OF THE COMMITIEE ON COMPANY
LAW AMENDMENT (1945) [hereinafter cited as COHEN REPORT]; and (7) GREAT BRITAIN
BOARD OF TRADE, COMPANY LAW CoMMITIEE REPORT (1962) [hereinafter cited as JENKINS
REPORT].
22 A full discussion will be found in FORMOY, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN
COMPANY LAW pt. 2, § 4 (1923), and HUNT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORA·
TION IN ENGLAND, 1800-1867, ch. 5 (1936).
23 Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 &: 9 Viet., c. 16.
2, Gladstone in the House of Commons {HANSARD, LXXV [1844] 277), quoted by
HuNT, op. cit. supra note 22, at 95.
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that the promoter file particulars of the name and purpose of the
company, together with a copy of every prospectus or circular
addressed to the public.25 There were no provisions specifying the
required content of the prospectus, nor were there mechanics for
enforcing liability. The history of English securities regulation
may be summarized as repeated attempts to increase the effectiveness of the required disclosure. Content of the prospectus was
specified in detail; 26 requirements of distributing and filing a
prospectus were increased; 27 civil liability of parties preparing
the prospectus was tightened; 28 and a distinction was made between
private and public companies, with disclosure requirements applying only to the latter.29
Only in the past thirty years has there been reasonably
effective protection of investors in England concerning new issue
distribution. This protection, however, has not been due to a sole
reliance on disclosure, but is a result of the development of unofficial regulatory devices, primarily by the London Stock
Exchange. 80 The action by the London Exchange has been successful because there is virtually no over-the-counter market in
England. This means that a company wishing to sell its securities
to the public must acquire a listing on an exchange. Before the
London Exchange grants a listing, approval must be obtained
from the New Issue Committee. While specific standards are not
articulated, the Committee apparently often denies listing even
if complete disclosure is present. In this manner undesirable
25 Companies Act, 1845, 8 &: 9 Viet., c. 16, § 4.
26 Certain items were required in the Companies Act, 1867, 30 &: 31 Viet., c. 131,
§§ 30-31, 38. Comprehensive coverage was obtained in the Companies Act, 1900, 63 &: 64
Viet., c. 48, and changes were made in the subsequent Companies Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7,
c. 50; 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23; 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 47.
27 The Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69, provided that a statement
must be filed with the registrar of companies by a public company even if no prospectus
was used. In the Companies Act, 1929, 19 &: 20 Geo. 5, c. 23, § 29, offers for sale were
made subject to prospectus requirements, and undenvriters offering on behalf of a company had to furnish a prospectus. It was not until the Companies Act, 1948, 11 &: 12
Geo. 6, c. 38, that restrictions on placing of securities were complete. See COHEN REPORT

,r 22.

28 The Companies Act, 1900, 63 &: 64 Viet., c. 48, increased liabilities of directors and
promoters. This has remained a controversial area. See NAPIER, H1sroRY OF JOINT STOCK
COMPANIES' LIABILlTY IN A CENTURY OF LAW REFORM 379-411 (1901); COHEN REPORT
1111 41, 64. Further changes were made in Companies Act, 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38,
§§ 60, 63; Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 &: 7 Eliz. 2, c. 45, §§ 13, 14.
29 Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 69.
80 In 1930 the London Stock Exchange reformed its rules as a result of abuses in the
preceding years, when securities of new companies that had been distributed through the
exchange had injured numerous investors. See MAGUIRE, THE STOCK ExcHANGE As A
NATIONAL lNSIITUTION (1949).
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stocks are kept from the public.81 In addition to the regulatory
work of the Exchange, the issuing houses-a relatively small group
of firms that handle the bulk of the underwriting-have been
given credit for playing an important, although unofficial, role in
investor protection. They, too, go beyond a requirement of disclosure and refuse to be associated with a poorly planned or
financed company. While statistical evidence is not available, the
latest study of securities regulation conducted by the Jenkins
Committee expressed little concern regarding investor frauds in
new issue sales.82
In the United States, the disclosure device for regulation of
issuers of securities was adopted with relatively little discussion
as to its merits.83 The objective of the corrective legislation, as
stated in Democratic Party Platform in 1932, was to protect the
small investor from fraud in the initial purchase of securities.34
This purpose was reiterated by President Roosevelt in his address
to Congress in 1933.35 The specific frame of reference was the
speculative outburst of the late 1920's and the subsequent market
crash.
For several years prior to 1933 many serious writers had been
Sl "In (the Record's) Department is a dosier of anyone who in the past has 'kicked
over the traces' in any way. And if that person's name is connected, however remotely,
with a subsequent subscription of capital, you may be sure that the Stock Exchange
Council is going to be very wary before it gives permission to deal in that subsequent
issue." WINCOIT, THE STOCK EXCHANGE 128 (1946). See also The Stock Exchange Committee and the Investor, 111 The Economist 323 (1930). The role of the exchange was
recognized in the Cohen Report and the Jenkins Report, and the Companies Act, 1948,
11 &: 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, § 39(1), gives certain exemptions for companies granted a listing
in an exchange.
32 "The new issues market is now virtually monopolised by a small number of firms
who are experts in this type of transaction and who either devote themselves entirely to
it or who combine it with merchant banking and acting as company registrars or the like.
Most of these firms are members of the Issuing Houses Association and their high repute,
and their determination not to forfeit it, are probably the greatest safeguards which the
public have. The nature of the role which they play differs somewhat according to the
method of issue employed, but in most cases they will be associated with it either as
principals or agents of the company and, if it is unsuccessful, will incur a risk either to
their pockets or their reputations or both. Hence the close scrutiny which they give to
issues which they sponsor is a far more effective restraint on fraudulent or uneconomic
issues than any legal regulations." GOWER, THE PRINCIPLES OF MonERN COMPANY LAw
269 (1957). See also JENKINS REPORT 1f11 11, 225, 227.
83 The best commentaries on the legislative history are MoLEY, AFTER SEVEN YEARS
175-84 (1939); James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REv. 624 (1934); Landis,
The Legislative History of the Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959).
See also Gadsby, Historical Development of the S.E.C.-The Government View, 28 GEO.
WMH. L. REV. 6 (1959).
84 77 CONG. REc. 2923 (1933) (Remarks of Rep. Bulwinkle in reference to the Democratic national platform and President Roosevelt's message to Congress, cited note 35
infra).
85 H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933).
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advocating the need for companies to disclose financial data. For
most, the objective was not necessarily to protect the small investor
from fraud, but a desire to assure a free and open securities
market. For example, in Main Street and Wall Street, William
Ripley stated: "Must one reiterate that the prevention of fraud,
while important, is limited to a few companies; while the registration of a fair market price, consonant with the real earning power
of the company, is a matter of daily and universal importance to
every shareholder who may have occasion to buy or to sell
securities?" 36
This concern over a free market was based on the theory that,
given adequate information, the laws of supply and demand, combined with action by each purchaser for his own best interest,
would establish a true market value for the security. For some,
the need for a "free market" was tied to a recognition of the
great growth of the largest corporations. In The Modern Corporation and Private Property, A. A. Berle, Jr., and Gardner Means
advocated disclosure on the part of companies because investors,
being separated from direct management and control of the company, buy and sell securities on the faith of the market appraisal
of the value of the stock. Disclosure is needed because this cannot
be a valid appraisal unless there is free and equal information
about all companies.37
Brandeis, to whom many give credit for being the strongest
advocate for full disclosure, also directed his principal fire against
the big companies. His famous quotation, "sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman,"38 was made in relation to the amount of underwriting commissions received by J. P. Morgan & Co. for their role in selling
securities of major companies.
The arguments for disclosure expressed by these men applied
equally to the need for continuing disclosure through annual
reports, as much as to the need for disclosure at the time of initial
offering. All would probably have argued that disclosure would
help prevent fraud in the initial sale of securities to small investors, but this was not necessarily their main objective.
Individuals such as Douglas, who had their eyes strictly on the
problem of protecting the small investor from fraudulent schemes,
36 RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET, 219 (1927).
37 BERLE &: MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
particularly pp. 300-25).
38 BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S

MONEY

62 (new ed. 1933).

PRIVATE PROPERTY

(1933) (see
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doubted that disclosure by companies was sufficient. Douglas advocated the need to control "unsound securities" and "high
pressure salesmanship" if the average investor was to be adequately
protected. 89
Many states, following the example of Kansas in 1911, had
enacted Blue Sky Laws which provided regulatory schemes to
prohibit certain companies from selling securities to the public.40
In 1933, the first bill submitted to both houses of Congress was
basically regulatory and provided that permission to sell securities
could be denied on an administrative finding that "the enterprise
or business of the issuer ... is not based on sound principles ..."
or that the issuer "is in any way dishonest" or "in unsound condition or insolvent." 41 With comparatively little discussion, the
present Securities Act was substituted for the bill initially filed.
The main argument for disclosure was that a regulatory approach
was not administratively practical. 42 Whether the disclosure approach alone would in fact protect small investors from fraudulent
schemes or the making of poor investments was generally not
discussed.
In brief, the Securities Act prohibits a company from directly
or indirectly offering to sell securities to the public unless a
registration statement has been filed with the Commission. Any
offering in writing is deemed a prospectus and must conform to
specific requirements. A sale to the public cannot take place until
the registration has become effective-at least twenty days after
filing-and a current prospectus must be sent at the time of sale
if it has not been done previously. The registration statement
must contain detailed information about the company and the
distribution, including: a description of the business; its organization, financial history, and capital structure; names and compensation of officers and directors; description of special interests
of management; description of property; financial statements; and
the plan of distribution and intended use of proceeds. The
30 See Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. (N.S.) 521, 523 (1934). See also
Douglas &: Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933). For recent
statements advocating regulation beyond disclosure, see Joslin, Federal Securities Regulation From the Small Investors' Perspective, 6 J. PuB. L. 219 (1957); Wright, Correlation
of State Blue Sky Laws and the Federal Securities Acts, 26 CORNELL L.Q. 259, 262 (1941).
40 Kan. Laws 1911, ch. 133, see I Loss, op. cit. supra note 4, at 23-105 for citation and
general discussion of state Blue Sky Laws.
41 H.R. 4314 and S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. § 6 (1933).
42 77 CONG. REc. 2918, 2931, 2947-51 (1933) (discussion of S. 875 and H.R. 4314, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) ). But see H.R. REP. No. 1363, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), which
stresses tbe value of publicity in bringing about a situation where tbe market price reflects as nearly as possible a just price.
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prospectus must include all data required by the registration, with
the exception of certain specific items such as exhibits, marketing
arrangements, and data on subsidiaries.
The Securities Act included two important extensions beyond
the English Companies Act designed to offer greater investor
protection. First, under the Securities Act there is a waiting period
of at least twenty days between the filing of the registration statement and the time when a sale can be made; under the English
System the prospectus need not be filed until the time of sale}8
The second and more important difference is that the Commission
closely checks the registration statement for misstatements and
omissions. In England the prospectus is filed with the Board of
Trade, and little or no checking is done by that organization.44
Through the informal administrative device of the deficiency
letter, the Commission insures that the registration statement and
prospectus clearly state the facts.
B. Evaluation of the Issuance Requirements
Certainly the disclosures required by Securities Act have made
the markets more free, as well as better evaluators of the worth
of securities. The legal requirement of disclosure removed any
competitive disadvantage incurred by those who had volunteered
full information. The high quality of administrative checking
has permitted investors to rely on the published prospectus. It
can be safely stated that the Securities Act has prevented numerous
investors from buying poor quality stocks. Further, knowledge of
the detailed scrutiny of registration statements by the Commission has had a prophylactic effect in discouraging shady promoters
from attempting to go to the public for capital. The Securities Act
appears to have acted well in times of normal market behavior.
In times of speculative hysteria, however, the disclosure requirements of the Securities Act, even with the verification of material
by the Commission, have not been sufficient to prevent serious
investor loss.
The Special Study Report dealt with the distribution of
securities only to a limited extent, but some material is presented
on new issue behavior during the period 1952 to 1962.45 A survey
48 CoHEN REPORT ,r 27 (1945). In 1948 The Companies Act, 1948, 11 &: 12 Geo. 6,
c. 38, § 50(5), provided that a period of at least three days must elapse between issuance
of the prospectus and the opening of the subscription list.
44 JENKINS REPORT 1J 227.
45 Of the thirteen chapters of the Report of the Special Study, only chapter IV-A
dealt with distribution problems. Even here, the emphasis was on the role of the underwriter and not on the issuer.
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was made of all companies which sold securities through a public
offering for the first time during this period-an estimated 2,880
corporations.46 The companies were divided into two categories:
"promotional"-those formed within one year of going public or
those with no net income for at least one of two preceding fiscal
years; and "operational"-all others. The survey revealed that
by the fall of 1962 a total of thirty-seven percent of the companies
which had sold securities to the public between 1952 and 1962
could not be located or were known to be liquidated, inactive, or
in receivership, and only thirty-four percent showed a net profit
on their last balance sheet. For the promotional companies, a total
of fifty-five percent were apparently out of business, and only
fourteen percent showed a net profit on the last balance sheet.
It is estimated that 1,050 companies making their first public
offering between 1952 and 1962 had failed by 1962, after having
raised over one hundred million dollars from investors.
While there is need for an avenue for companies to be able
to raise risk capital, it appears obvious that many of these companies, particularly those with no operational history, went public
only to benefit the promoters, insiders, and underwriters. Thus,
one part of the current problem involving new issues is that
numerous untried promotional companies which soon fail are
able to sell their securities in spite of the initial disclosure requirements. Another aspect is the "hot issue" phenomena.47 The
"hot issue" as described by the Special Study is a security of a
new company which is sold at a premium over its offering price
immediately after the initial distribution. In many instances the
supply of such a security is artificially controlled by underwriters,
and active efforts are made to stimulate demand. In most instances,
the market price of the "hot issues" fell below the offering price
several months following the offering.48
High pressure selling is one of the most important factors
involved in the sale of unsound securities and the unrealistic
prices accompanying the sale of "hot issues." Improper selling
practices constitute a large subject, involving qualifications and
supervision of salesmen, in addition to direct regulatory control.49
Here, it is only necessary to point out that, even though a comspedal Study pt. I, at 491 n.29, 550-53.
See Special Study pt. 1, at 516-47.
48 The unseasoned issues had a greater price fluctuation than the seasoned issues. Of
the unseasoned issues offered in 1961, 85% sold at premiums immediately after issue, and
by September 1962, 77% of them sold below the offering price. Id. at 516-17.
40 See Comment, 62 MICH. L. REv. 680, 730 (1964).
46
47
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pany makes adequate disclosure, the investor comes in contact
only with the salesman, not with the company. Active touting by
an aggressive salesman is far more likely to sell securities than the
prospectus, with its often lengthy, dull, and complex presentation.
The combination of the speculative fervor of investors with
the attitudes of some promoters, underwriters, and security salesmen created a situation beyond the control of the Commission
and the Securities Act. In part, there was a breakdown of disclosure mechanisms. The waiting period designed to provide
time for investor study of the issue failed in its objective. Indications of interest were obtained by telephone, and in many instances no preliminary prospectus was sent.50 The investor's first
real information about the company came with the final
prospectus mailed with his confirmation of purchase. Investors
buying in the market immediately following the distributions
were generally not furnished any prospectus at all. 51 As these new
issues were not listed on an exchange, there was no requirement
for continuous reports, and the investor often could not obtain
current information about his company.52 The great increase in
the number of new issues and the limited staff of the Commission
meant that detailed checking of registration statements and
prospectus was curtailed.53 Also, even when an investor was presented with an accurate prospectus prior to his purchase, the
50 Unless the offer is in writing, no prospectus need be sent. Securities Act § 5, 48
Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1958). See Special Study pt. 1, at 547-50. See also id. pt. 1,
at 265-68 on the problem of the boiler rooms.
51 There is no requirement to send a prospectus when the sales are unsolicited, or
when the sale is solicited forty days after the date upon which the security was bona
fide offered to the public. Securities Act § 4, 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958).
Furthermore, many broker-dealers failed to send a prospectus even for a solicited offer
within the forty-day period. Special Study pt. 1, at 547-50.
52 See Part Ill infra. A senior partner of one of the largest brokerage houses in the
country has said: "In fact, it would be my judgment that newly organized, promotional
enterprises with little or no record of business performance, whether they be regulation
A or otherwise, should be required to make monthly progress reports to their stockholders to keep them informed as to how their money is being used-just as it would
be in the case of a partnership. Such monthly reporting should be required until they
have reached a stage where their size and maturity and everything about them were
such that they would be qualified for listing if they so desired. At that point the requirements could be relaxed to the standards of listed companies." Quoted in Special Study
pt. 3, at 9-10.
53 During fiscal 1961, 1,830 registration statements were filed, of which 958, or 52%,
were filed by companies that had not previously filed registration statements under the
Securities Act of 1933. 27 SEC ANN. REP. 29 (1961). During the fiscal 1950, 496 registration
statements were filed, of which 112, or 23%, were first filings. 16 SEC ANN. REP. 8 (1950).
On the other hand, there were a total of 998 Commission personnel in fiscal 1950, id. at
167, while in fiscal 1961 the total number of personnel had increased to 1,087. 27 SEC
ANN. REP. 197 (1961). Thus while Commission personnel increased about 10%, first filings
increased about 850%.
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presentation in most instances tended to discourage reading by
all but the most knowledgeable and tenacious. Recommendations of the Special Study were aimed at correcting some of these
gaps. Legislation proposed by the Commission would extend the
time during which a prospectus must be sent to purchasers. 54 It
has also been suggested by numerous sources that the objective of
disclosure can be improved by demanding a better written and
clearer prospectus. 55 A short form of summary to point out the
hazards of investing in a non-operating promotional company,
with a clear statement of underwriting costs, equity dilution, and
the cost of promoters' shares could be of help.56 The Commission
has taken steps in this direction, but more could still be done.
Even with the disclosure mechanisms working perfectly, would
they prevent abuses and investor losses in a period like that of 1959
to 1962? As mentioned above, the English experience has been
that something more than disclosure is needed. For the English,
an apparently workable solution is provided by the unofficial regulation by the London Exchange and the underwriters themselves.
In this country the solution is not so easy. New issues are distributed and traded through the over-the-counter market. The
exchanges have a minor role in distributions, and the underwriting community is not currently designed to play a regulatory
role. Many of the larger underwriters have in fact worked hard
to protect their reputations, and apparently have not become
associated with a stock offering unless they believed the company
had a good chance of success, and that full and continuing disclosure would be made to investors. 57 These same underwriters
attempted to avoid an artificial run-up in price of their newly
54 On July 30, 1963, the Senate passed S. 1642 (The Securities Acts Amendments of
1963), in which the forty-day period during which all dealers are required to deliver prospectus was extended to ninety days in the case of first issues. 1963 U.S. Code Cong. &:
Admin. News, No. 9, p. xxi (Aug. 20, 1963). The Special Study also recommended that the
Commission make acceleration of the effective date conditional on delivery of the prospectus at least two days before the sale. Special Study pt. I, at 558.
55 See l Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 261-65 (2d ed. 1961), dealing with the problem
of the unreadable prospectus; Special Study pt. 1, at 552.
56 "\Ve have a concrete suggestion on this point. It is that each prospectus be accompanied by a one-page summary of the more important facts about the issue, in a form
approved by the SEC. The summary should contain at least a brief reference, citing page
numbers, to every unfavorable factor described in the prospectus itself and deemed to be
of more than incidental importance. Such a one-page summary could tell the investor
pretty well what he is getting for his money." GRAHAM, DODD 8: CoTILE, SECURITY
ANALYSIS 677 (4th ed. 1962).
57 "Most of the older firms exercised careful investment banking judgment in determining which companies were suitable for public ownership, and in so doing still provided many small companies with access to the capital markets." Special Study pt. 1,
at 553.
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issued securities. It was easy, however, to be an underwriter
during 1959-62; and a company turned down by one brokerdealer could find someone else who was not as particular.58
Recommendations of the Special Study regarding requirements of higher qualifications for underwriters and salesmen and
the developing of self-regulatory bodies are commendable. It
should be recognized, however, that serious problems remain.
Disclosure, as called for in the Securities Act and enforced administratively by the Commission, has done much to assure that,
at least in normal times, the market can fairly appraise new
securities, and that investors will be reasonably protected. In times
of speculative outbursts, disclosure alone is not, and probably
cannot be, adequate protection for investors. In the absence of
effective federal protection, there is pressure for the states to take
a more active role. 59 This leads only to confusion and unfairness.
The record of promotional companies is such that some federal
action to limit their access to the public market seems desirable.
The Commission should attempt to determine various specific
factors of success or failure and make proposals as to the additional
powers needed.
Ill.

OBLIGATION OF THE ISSUER

To

MAKE CONTINUOUS

DISCLOSURE THROUGH PERIODIC REPORTS

That a corporation selling stock to a purchaser should disclose
financial information concerning the company is merely an extension of the normal seller's obligation based on the nature of
the commodity. A more difficult problem has been to justify the
need for a corporation to continue to make disclosures. Specifically, the question is the extent of the company's obligation to
individuals who purchase from existing shareholders. It is argued
that once a distribution is completed, a company has no interest
58 "To a large extent, broker-dealers who managed the underwriting of unseasoned
issues of common stock in 1961 were relative newcomers to the field. . • . More than half
(271) of these underwriters had been organized less than 6 years before the offering, while
over one-fourth (146) were formed either in the year preceding or the year in which the
offering was made." Special Study pt. 1, at 493-94. As an indication of a tougher attitude
toward underwriters, see In the Matter of The Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act
Release No. 4584, Feb. 27, 1963. In this release, the Commission issued a stop order suspending the effectiveness of a registration statement. Among the grounds stated were
(1) failure of the registration statement to disclose the limited experience of the under•
writer and (2) lack of an independent investigation of the underwriter by the issuer.
59 For example, note the active role of the state of California in developing a strict
regulatory program. See SCHLEI, STATE REGULATION OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL PRAcnCES:
THE CALIFORNIA ExPERIENCE (1961); Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the
California Corporate Securities Act, 33 CALIF. L. REV. 343 (1945).
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in later trading in its securities. The transaction is between two
private parties, and the company plays no role. That this argument
has been effective is demonstrated by the different obligations of
the issuer depending on whether the sale is by the issuer or is
between two parties having no relation to the issuer. During a
distribution and for forty days thereafter, the issuer has a positive
duty to furnish a prospectus to any purchaser. 00 A purchaser who
buys the company's stock after the forty-day period, or from a
source other than the company, need not be furnished with anything. The anomaly becomes most acute when a company which
has shares currently outstanding makes a new offering of identical
shares. A purchaser who buys shares of the new offering must be
furnished a prospectus; a purchaser buying shares the same day,
but purchasing from another shareholder in the over-the-counter
market or on an exchange, need not be furnished with any information.61 There are, however, a variety of requirements which
insure that current financial data of many companies is available
to the investor who has the initiative to seek it out. However, these
requirements do not apply to all companies, and the most pressing
problem in this area is the need to expand the coverage.
There is also need to recognize the overlapping function of
continuous reporting requirements and the registration and
prospectus requirements applicable when a new distribution is
made. The investor would be better protected and companies
would avoid unnecessary burdens if a closer integration of the requirements could be achieved. A corollary to this integration
would be increased availability of the periodic financial reports,
and the obtaining of better and more standardized reports from
the companies.

A. Background and Current Practices
The requirement that companies disclose financial data on
a continuing basis has taken two approaches. The first and oldest
was initiated by the exchanges. If a company wants to be listed on
an exchange it must agree to submit periodic reports. Becoming
listed on an exchange came to be a voluntary act by the company,
and reporting was one of the commitments made by the company
in the listing agreement with the exchange. The London Exoo Securities Act

§ 4(1), 48 Stat. 77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1958).
Under Securities Act Rule 153, if the securities are listed, delivery of the prospectus
is accompanied by delivery to the exchange; there is no requirement that a purchaser
actually receive a prospectus. 17 C.F.R. § 230.153 (1949).
01
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change required such disclosure before any periodic reports were
demanded in the Companies Act,62 and the New York Stock
Exchange had required annual reports of listed companies for
several years before enactment of the Exchange Act.63 The Exchange Act codified this approach, applying it to all registered
exchanges and requiring that reports be filed with the Commission as well as the Exchange.64 Nothing need be given to
purchasers, but current information about the company is on
file. Currently, all companies listed on a national exchange are
required to file the following reports: 65
(1) Annual Reports (Form 10-K), which must include:
(a) A balance sheet and profit and loss statement prepared according to the Commission's accounting regulations and certified by an independent public accountant;
(b) Disclosure of any interest of an officer or director in
a material transaction of the corporation; and
(c) Various data on principal shareholders, officers and
directors, including their remuneration, amounts accrued in retirement plans, and exercise of stock options.
(2) Semi-Annual Reports (Form 9-K), which include an uncertified profit and loss statement.
(3) Current Reports (Form 8-K), which must be filed on the
occurrence of any event of immediate interest to shareholders, such as
(a) Change in control;
(b) Acquisition or sale of a significant amount of assets;
(c) Involvement in important legal proceedings; and
(d) Any matter which requires a vote of shareholders.
The second approach toward the obtaining of continuous financial data is to require that information be sent to existing shareIn 1881 the London Stock Exchange began to require annual reports. See Ducum,
THE STOCK EXCHANGE: !TS HISTORY AND POSITION 355 (1901).
63 Beginning in 1920 the New York Stock Exhange required comprehensive
financial reports prior to listing. See RIPLEY, op. cit. supra note 36, at 210.
64 Exchange Act §§ 12, 13, 48 Stat. 892, 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m (1958).
65 Form 10-K, adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4991, Jan. 28,
1954, is to be used for annual reports pursuant to §§ 13 or 15d of the Exchange Act, for
which no other form is prescribed. Form 9-K, adopted in SEC Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 5189, June 23, 1955, is to be used for the semi-annual reports required by
Rules 13a-13 and 15d-13 of the General Rules and Regulations under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-13, 240.15d-13 (1949). Form 8-K, adopted in
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 4991, Jan. 28, 1954, is to be used for current
reports under §§ 13 or 15d of the Exchange Act, filed pursuant to Rule X-13A-ll or
62
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holders. The Exchange Act requires that any proxy solicited by a
company listed on an exchange conform to the rules of the Commission. 66 Through its rule-making power, the Commission has
enacted comprehensive requirements governing what must be
disclosed when proxies are solicited for votes on various corporate
matters. For example, the proxy statement sent prior to annual
meetings for election of directors must contain the name of each
nominee and his principal occupation, amount of equity shareholdings in the company, remuneration (if over 30,000 dollars),
retirement benefits, stock options, and any interest in material
transactions with the company. In addition, an annual report must
be sent containing financial statements which adequately reflect
the financial position and operation of the company. 67
If a company can obtain a quorum without soliciting proxies,
there is no requirement under the Exchange Act that the shareholders be sent anything. However, the New York Stock Exchange
requires all listed companies to solicit proxies. 68 The proxy machinery is a most effective disclosure device, and for companies
listed on the NYSE there is, in fact, a wealth of information available. As will be discussed later, the main problem with regard to
listed companies is not the obtaining of information; it is the
presentation of such information in a clear and standardized manner, readily accessible to investors.

B. Evaluation of the Continuing Disclosure Requirements
I. Extension of Required Reporting
A third approach to continuous reporting is desperately needed
in order to provide data on companies which are not listed on an
Rule X-15D-ll. There are other forms, such as Form 7-K, adopted in SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 6820, June 12, 1962 (for quarterly reports of certain real
estate companies), which deal with particular kinds of companies.
Exchange Act § 14, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958).
SEC Reg. 14A, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a (Cum. Supp. 1963). Note that the minimum information specified depends on the subject matter of the election, e.g., the selection of
auditors; the approval of bonus and profit-sharing plans; approval of pension and retirement plans; modification or exchange of securities; mergers, consolidations, and acquisitions. The Commission recently took a long overdue step in proposing an amendment to
its proxy rules requiring that financial statements in annual reports sent to stockholders
"be consistent in all material respects" with reports filed with the Commission. The Wall
St. J., Nov. 19, 1963, p. 8, cols. 2-3.
68 New York Stock Exchange Rule 499, dealing with suspension from dealings or
removal from the list, indicates that the Exchange "would normally give consideration
to suspending or removing from the list a security of a company when ••• proxies are
not solicited for all meetings of stockholders." The American Stock Exchange is reported
to be embarking on a program to achieve the same results. See S. REP. No. 379, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1963).
66
67
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exchange. This approach is simply to place an obligation to disclose, to both potential investors and existing shareholders, on all
companies which have securities in the hands of the public. This
obligation should be present regardless of any voluntary act on the
part of the company to become listed on an exchange. It would
apply even if the company has never had a public offering under
the Securities Act. 69 As recommended by the Special Study and
in proposed legislation proposed by the Commission, it would take
the form of extending the reporting requirements of section 13
and the proxy restrictions of section 14, of the Exchange Act to
securities traded in the over-the-counter market.70
The justification for bringing these companies under federal
regulation is that it is in the public interest. At the time the Exchange Act was passed, the bulk of securities in which there was
active trading were listed on at least one of the numerous exchanges. It was not until the 1920's that common stock was used
to any extent in this country as the sole means of financing ventures
other than oil, mining, and other speculative issues, and the distribution and later trading were generally done through the facilities
of an exchange. It is reported that, at various times, over I 00
exchanges have existed in the United States-and over 35 during
the late 1920's.71 An over-the-counter market did exist, but little
was known of its scope or operation. 72 Since the 1930's the overthe-counter market has had tremendous growth. This is due in
part to improved communications (the development of the openend teletype in 1932-33 was a major factor) which made a central
location less important; and it appears that the securities acts themselves aided the growth. After the Securities Act, new issues were
not distributed through exchanges, and at least their initial trading
had to be in the over-the-counter market. Since the Exchange
Act, many companies have refrained from listing, and others, such
as banks, have delisted in order to avoid the required disclosures. 78
69 The Exchange Act § 15, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 780 (1958),
provides that any company registering under the Securities Act and having a value of
over $2,000,000 (aggregate offering price plus the value of other securities of the same
class) must file periodic reports as required under § 13.
70 Special Study pt. 3, at 62; see S. 1642, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
71 For early history of securities trading in the United States, see MARTIN, A CENTURY
OF FINANCE (1898); MEDHENRY, MEN AND MYSTERIES OF WALL STREET (1870); COLE, EARLY
EXCHANGES (1943) (unpublished monograph in Securities and Exchange Commission
Library).
72 An over-the-counter market existed prior to the organization of the exchanges.
The draftsmen of the Securities Act specifically left the question of the over-the-counter
market open until further study. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
73 At the present time only five banks are listed on national exchanges. Special
Study pt. 3, at 36.
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There are virtually no requirements that a company not listed
on an exchange send even an annual report to its stock.holders. A
recent check of the corporation laws of all fifty states and the District of Columbia reveals that twenty-two states have corporate
reporting requirements of one type or another. Of these, in only
fourteen states are the reports available to shareholders, and in
three the requirement may be dispensed with by including a contrary stipulation in the by-laws. Specific requirements of content
for reports are generally nonexistent, and only two states require
certification by a public accountant. 74 In no state is there any requirement dealing with proxy solicitation or allowing a state
agency to exercise control over the form or content of proxy material.
All of the arguments for disclosure raised at the time the securities acts were enacted apply equally well to securities traded overthe-counter. If these protections are needed for investors of listed
stocks, they are certainly necessary for holders of over-the-counter
stocks. Evidence compiled by the Special Study shows unquestionably that voluntary reporting and the quality of proxies issued by
over-the-counter companies are inadequate.75 Investor fraud appears more prevalent with regard to unlisted securities, 76 and
unquestionably a more free and open market is needed for these
securities. The double standard should be eliminated, and companies should decide whether they should be listed on an exchange
by reference to market considerations rather than a desire to avoid
required filing of reports. On the positive side, the addition of
a disclosure requirement to the over-the-counter market should
increase investor confidence, which could lead to increased trading
volume, better markets, and reduced selling costs.
It has been reported that there are about 580,000 corporations
in the United States.77 Conceivably, all of these could have secu74 In Massachusetts, certification is needed for a corporation with over $100,000 in
stock. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 156, § 49 (1959). Certification is also required in Pennsylvania, but a corporate by-law may dispense with the requirement. PA. STAT, ANN. tit. 15,
§ 2852-318 (1958). Almost all states require financial data with tax reports, but these are
uniformly considered confidential.
75 Over 25% of the companies sampled by the Special Study did not send any information at all to shareholders. Major difficulties were found in many instances. Spedal Study
pt. 3, at 10-14.
76 Ninety-three percent of companies involved in fraud actions under the Securities
Act or the Exchange Act between January 1961 and June 1962 were unlisted companies
not required to file periodic reports. Id. at IO.
77 This is the number filing Federal Income Tax returns. It is estimated that about
50,000 have at least occasional over-the-counter trading. FRIEND, HOFFMAN 8: WINN, THE
OVER·THE·COUNTER SECURITIES MARKET 5, 46 (1958).
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rities which are traded at least occasionally. In England, a distinction is drawn between the private and public company, with
a private company of under fifty shareholders not subject to disclosure requirements. 78 The recommendations of the Special Study
called for all companies with more than 300 shareholders to be
brought under the disclosure provisions of the Exchange Act.70
The current legislative proposal of the Commission would include
all corporations with 500 shareholders and one million dollars in
assets. 80
While it can be argued that it is in the public interest to protect
even one shareholder, it would seem that the greatest need for investor protection exists when the company has shareholders who
are, in fact, involved in trading activity. It is when a security is
in the over-the-counter market, in the sense that broker-dealers are
quoting a market and trading takes place, that the federal government has an interest. From statistics gathered by the Special Study
it appears that, based on the number of dealers quoting a security
and the amount of trading as indicated by the shares transferred,
companies with 200 or more shareholders should probably be included under the disclosure requirements. An asset test does not
seem to have any bearing on the public interest. The survey conducted by the Special Study indicated that twenty-two percent of
the companies reporting less than one million dollars in assets had
300 shareholders or more, and about eleven percent had 1,000
shareholders or more.81 For example, many research and electronic
companies have high sales, but operate with leased buildings and
equipment and thus report low assets. Also, many of the new promotional companies coming to the market for the first time have low
assets, and their sorry record demonstrates the need for continuous
reporting to help protect investors.
The higher requirement of number of shareholders and the
asset test in the proposed legislation are intentionally designed to
reduce the number of companies subject to the disclosure requirements. 82 This reflects a concern over the administrative burden
thrown on the Commission in checking these reports. The proposed legislation is unduly cautious, and the coverage should be
Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38.
special Study pt. 3, at 62.
so S. 1642, passed by the Senate on July 30, 1963, 109 CoNG. R.Ec. 12962 ijuly 30, 1963).
81 Tables showing the interrelationship of shares transferred, number of brokerdealers quoting the security, number of shareholders, and asset size are found in the text
and appendix to the Special Study pt. 3, ch. IX.
82 See S. REP. No. 379, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 20, 21, 27 (1963).
78
79
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expanded. Two somewhat contradictory suggestions are made in
answer to the argument that the Commission is not capable of
policing the increased number of firms. First, it is urged that the
Commission should attempt to make better use of automation to
check filed reports. The use of existing data processing equipment
could greatly improve and simplify the checking process. Instead
of storing the reservoir of material about a company in a file
drawer at the Commission, it could be placed on computer tape.
Periodic reports and proxy materials could be filed in a form to
be directly programmed into the computer and automatically
cross-checked for various items. Independent analysis would probably still be needed, but it could be kept to a minimum. The
second suggestion is to rely to a greater extent on private actions
to insure that companies report accurately. As was noted, the
Board of Trade in England-the closest equivalent to the SECdoes almost no checking of prospectuses or annual reports, but
relies on private remedies as the principal enforcement tool.
The existing specific civil remedies provided by the Exchange
Act for false or misleading statements in reports filed with the Commission offer little, if any, advantage over actions for common-law
fraud. Aside from showing the presence of a false or misleading
statement in a report, a plaintiff must also prove (a) that the price
of the security purchased or sold "was affected" by the statement
and (b) that he purchased or sold the security in reliance upon the
statement. In addition, a defendant may absolve himself from
liability by proving "that he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." 88 Proving
that price action was affected by any single factor 84 is an almost
impossible task with actively traded securities. When this burden
is coupled with the good faith defense, it is not surprising that no
case has been located in which a plaintiff was successful in recovering for a false or misleading statement in a filed report.
As a minimum, the liability for false or misleading statements
in periodic reports should correspond to the current provisions
with respect to false or misleading statements in a prospectus or
registration statement. For actions under the Securities Act, the
Exchange Act § 18, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 77r (1958).
Similar language is contained in § 9 of the Exchange Act. As an example of the
difficulty in proving the causes of price fluctuations, it is worthy of note that the Special
Study, after extensive study of the market as a whole and of individual securities, concluded, in reference to the price drop of May 1962, that "neither this study nor that of
the New York Stock Exchange was able to isolate and identify the 'causes' of the market
events of May 28, 29 and 31." Special Study pt. 4, at 859.
83
84
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burden of showing the effect of the false or misleading statement
is reversed, as the innocent purchaser is entitled to damages unless
the defendant can prove that the depreciation in value resulted
from some cause other than the defect in the registration statement. 85 A defendant other than the issuer may avoid liability if
he had a reasonable ground for belief and actually did believe in
the truth and accuracy of the statement contained in the registration statement. Perhaps something similar to this is needed to
protect a company from accidental reporting mistakes, but the
burden should be on the company to prove it had a reasonable
basis for its belief in the truth of the statement. 86 The civil liability provisions of the Securities Act have not resulted in a crushing burden on companies. 87 Holding companies to stricter civil
liabilities concerning their periodic reports would not be too
onerous, and would relieve some of the administrative load of
the Commission. There is a great need for companies with actively-traded securities to make periodic reports, and the excuse
of administrative burden is not a sound reason for the delay in
obtaining as complete coverage as possible.

2. Integration of Periodic Reports With
Registration Requirements
Better methods of checking filed reports and tougher civil
liability provisions are actually separate issues from that of increasing the number of companies required to report. It is generally acknowledged that the current work load of the Commission
prevents the careful checking of all filed reports. Increasing this
work load by doubling the number of reporting companies88 would
85 Securities Act § ll(e), 48 Stat. 83 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958), provides: "If the defendant proves that any portion or all of such damages represents other
than the depreciation in value of such security resulting from such part of the registra•
tion statement, with respect to which his liability is asserted, not being true or omitting
to state a material fact required to be stated therein or necessary to make the statements
therein not misleading, such portion of or all such damages shall not be recoverable."
. 86 Securities Act § llb, 48 Stat. 82 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1958). The burden here is
on the defendant to show reasonable investigation and reasonable ground for belief that
the statements were correct and true. This is far different from § 18 of the Exchange Act,
which provides that the defendant need only prove that he had no knowledge that the
statements were false.
87 In fact, only two reported cases were found which involved recovery under § 11 of
the Securities Act. A partial explanation is that the administrative checking eliminates
most misleading and erroneous statements. In addition, there undoubtedy have been
recoveries based on § 11 which were not reported or litigated. See 3 Loss, op. cit. supra
note 55, at 1721-42, 1747-54; Hayes, Tort Liability for Misstatements or Omissions in Sales
of Securities, 12 CLEV.•MAR. L. REv. 100 (1963); Simpson, Investors' Civil Remedies Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 12 DEPAUL L. REv. 71 (1962).
88 During the fiscal year ending June 30, 1962, there were 4,122 annual and other
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merely magnify the problem. The Commission directs its primary
attention to the investigation of registration statements for new
issues. This is necessary and proper with regard to companies
going public for the first time. For companies with securities
already outstanding, this concentration on new registrations rather
than the periodic reports is unwarranted. The periodic reports
provide a reservoir of data about a company that includes most of
the information that is found in a registration statement. If the
periodic reports were prepared and reviewed with the care presently given registration statements, and if there were stronger
sanctions for false or misleading statements, there would be little
need for a full registration for each new issue. 89
A closer integration of the disclosure required by the Securities
Act with that required by the Exchange Act could greatly reduce
the burden on companies subject to these acts, and at the same
time better perform the basic function of disclosure. The Special
Study recommended that the Commission develop such a program
of integration.00 This is a particularly important recommendation
when it is coupled with the proposal that broker-dealers be obligated to make wider use of the filed material. The Special Study
suggested that this obligation of the broker-dealer might include
"actually consulting available officially filed data prior to recommending or selling specific securities; furnishing copies to customers in appropriate cases. . . ." 91 These recommendations
move in the direction of reducing or removing the registration and
prospectus requirement for established companies, and substiperiodic reports filed by issuers under the Exchange Act of 1934. 18 SEC ANN. REP. 43
(1962). Adding to the burden of the Commission were 458 reports of issuers filed under
§ 30 of the Investment Company Act. Ibid. The Special Study estimated that a standard
of 200 shareholders or more would subject 6,373 new companies to the requirements of
the Exchange Act; a standard of 300 or more would add 5,472; a standard of 500 or more
would add 3,973; and a standard of 750 or more would add 2,860. Special Study pt. 3,
Table IX-F.
80 Certain economies are already present in the two acts. Rule 12b-35 of the Exchange Act provides for a simplified method of registration if a Securities Act registration
(Form S-1) is on file. 17 C.F.R. § 240.126-35 (1949). Rule 13a(3) permits a company to file
a copy of a Securities Act registration in place of its annual report (Form 10-K); and
Rule 13a(4) allows a company to incorporate by reference in its annual report copies of
prospectuses filed in accordance with Rule 424 of the Securities Act. Furthermore, the
Securities Act permits certain omissions of data required in Form S-1 if equivalent information is on file pursuant to the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. There have been
proposals for closer integration of these two acts discussed by Congress. See Hearings on
S. 2816 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 83d
Cong,, 2d Sess. 285 (1954). The Commission endorsed the proposal for high-grade bonds
but not for securities. Id. at 3-5.
oo Special Study pt. 1, at 594-95.
01 Id. at 329.
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tuting for these requirements obligations of stricter periodic reporting by the companies, as well as disclosure by broker-dealers
in all sales-not just the sale of new issues. This approach stresses
the importance of disclosure in the trading of securities and conforms with the important objective of providing a free market
to act as an evaluator of the value of each security. Only the company selling securities to the public for the first time should be
required to go through a full registration process. Commission
investigation of these companies can become even more detailed.
Established companies should be able to file a short form registration containing only data pertinent to the new issue. If a company
desires to use a prospectus as a selling tool, this document should
conform to minimum requirements; even here, however, a shorter,
more flexible form of prospectus would be possible.
3. Standardized Reporting of Financial Data
The heart of the disclosure required of issuers is the reporting
of financial data-the balance sheet and profit-and-loss statement.
The Commission has promulgated accounting regulations which
specify the general manner of reporting financial data for all material filed by a company under the securities acts. 92 In most instances, financial reports must be certified by an independent
public accountant. In spite of the regulations and required certification, the vast difference in accounting methods often prevents
a meaningful comparison between companies. Two companies
may in fact have identical operating histories, yet one can present
an annual profit-and-loss statement showing a profit, and the other
a loss. For example, it has been stated that oil companies can in
effect report whatever earnings they desire. Some companies can
write off intangible drilling costs in the year in which they are
incurred, while others capitalize such expenditures and depreciate
them over the expected life of the well. In addition, there is no
consistency in the grouping of items such as depreciation, depletion, leases, dry-hole costs, etc. 93 The skilled financial analyst, by
dint of hard work, visits to the company, and tracing of historical
data, is usually able to make an adequate judgment, but for the
92 Regulation S-X governs the form and content for reports required under the
Securities Act, Exchange Act, Investment Company Act, and Holding Company Act. See
generally RAPPAPORT, SEC ACCOUNTING PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1963) pp. 3-1,
3-2. Under the Holding Company Act the Commission has gone further and in Rules 26
and 93 required uniform accounts.
93 See Crane, A Security Analyst Looks at Annual Reports, 105 J. AccouNTANCY,
March 1958, p. 31; Wise, The Auditors Have Arrived, Fortune, Dec. 1960, p. 144.

1964]

DISCLOSURE

631

investor who relies only on financial reports comparisons between
companies are often impossible.
Lack of standardized accounting procedures reduces the value
of disclosure in all instances, but the problem is particularly acute
with regard to the periodic reports required by the Exchange Act.
These reports provide the basis for comparison of the merits of
particular companies, which evaluation in tum determines the
market price of the securities. Standardization and uniformity of
reporting is not an easy goal. Accounting problems can be extremely complex, and the subject is mentioned only because of
its importance in any evaluation of disclosure. Inherent are problems of valuation as well as the mechanics of reporting. It is reported that the proponents of uniformity, even among the certified
public accountants themselves, are in a distinct minority.94 The
Commission's regulations specify only broad outlines, and the
Commission accepts methods determined according to generally
accepted accounting practices.95 The accountants argue that the
proper accounting system must be designed to fit the needs of the
particular company, and that there is no "right" way. Even if
this argument is sound, it does not answer the question of why
financial data, when reported to the Commission and investors,
cannot be converted to a uniform format. While it may be true
that the Commission has accomplished some progress in improving
accounting standards, it has been hesitant in the past to take bold
steps toward requiring uniformity. If the accountants do not make
faster progress, the Commission must be increasingly more active.
One of the main functions of disclosure by companies is to permit
the market place to make an evaluation of the worth of securities.
Without uniformity of reporting practices this function cannot
be properly fulfilled.

JV.

DISCLOSURE OBLIGATIONS OF OTHER PARTICIPANTS
IN THE SECURITIES MARKETS

The usual concept of the role of disclosure in securities regulation includes only the obligation of the issuer of securitiesduties relating to the registration statement, the prospectus, and
04 The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants has a committee working
on the problems of uniformity, but it has had little reported success thus far. See Wise,
supra note 93.
95 "Financial statements may be filed in such form and order, and may use such
generally accepted terminology, as will best indicate their significance and character in
the light of the provisions applicable thereto." SEC Accounting Series Release No. 12,
Feb. 21, 1940.
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mandatory periodic reports. 96 Recent developments have demonstrated the increasingly significant role of disclosure in other phases
of security regulation, involving parties other than the issuer. Such
regulation involves corporate insiders, broker-dealers, investment
advisers, and other participants in the securities business. In these
instances disclosure is not the sole regulatory device, as it is with
issuers, but is coupled with direct requirements and prohibitions.
This section will briefly discuss the various aspects in which disclosure obligations relate to parties other than issuers.

A. Insider Transactions
Prior to the securities acts, a corporate official who made use of
inside information in his personal stock transactions was relatively
safe. He could usually be held liable for damages only if an investor could prove all the elements of a fraud action, including the
giving of a false or misleading statement, actual misuse of the information, and damages. 97
In many jurisdictions there has developed a positive duty on
the part of directors to disclose pertinent information, particularly
in cases involving purchases from existing shareholders. In some
instances this duty is absolute, and in others the duty exists depending on the "special facts" of the particular case.98 Even in
the jurisdictions where a duty of positive disclosure is established,
it is still necessary for a plaintiff to prove his reliance and damages.
If the plaintiff has purchased or sold on an exchange this proof is
an almost impossible task. 99
The securities acts meet the problem of insider transactions in
two ways: (I) section 16 of the Exchange Act requires insiders to
disclose all transactions in stock of their own companies, and attempts to deter any turnover of stock by an insider within a sixmonth period; 100 (2) fraud provisions of the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act require disclosure of inside information prior to
any transaction. 101
96 The obligations of corporate disclosure rest on others also, such as controlling
persons and underwriters acting on behalf of the company. Securities Act §§ 4, 5, 48 Stat.
77 (1933), 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e (1958).
97 See PROSSER, TORTS § 87 (2d ed. 1955).
98 For discussion of these views and citation of relevant cases, see BAKER &: CARY,
CORPORATIONS 525-35 (1959); 3 Loss, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1446-48; Hill, The Sale of
Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REv. 986 (1957).
99 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358, 186 N.E. 659 (1933). See also note
111 infra.
100 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1958).
101 The anti-fraud provisions are Securities Act § 17(a), 48 Stat. 84 (1933), 15 U.S.C.
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Each officer, director, or beneficial owner of more than ten
percent of any listed security is required to file with the Commission an initial statement of his holdings in all equity securities of
the company. Thereafter, monthly reports must be filed reflecting
any change in his holdings. The Commission publishes each
month an Official Summary of Security Transactions and Holdings
summarizing the transactions included in all the various ownership reports filed that month. The regular circulation of this
publication exceeds 16,000 copies monthly. In addition, all filed
reports are available for inspection at the Commission and at the
exchanges. 102 The publicity given these reports by the financial
press enables investors to be informed of management's attitude
toward its company. Substantial purchases and sales must usually
be explained. The net result is that most insiders of listed companies do relatively little trading in their own securities.103
There are specific prohibitions in addition to the required
disclosures. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act discourages all
transactions by an insider in which a purchase and sale, or sale
and purchase, take place within a six-month period, for it provides
for the recovery by or on behalf of the corporation of all profits
realized. This twofold approach is an example of how disclosure
can be supplemented to meet a particular regulatory problem.
The automatic recovery of short-swing profits does serve to prevent the more egregious forms of abuse by insiders, though it is
a crude tool which still creates numerous problems.104 Allowing
the corporation to recover can be justified on practical grounds,
and also on the theory that an officer or director making use of
inside information is taking a corporate opportunity and should
disgorge his profits. 1011
§ 77q (1958), Securities Exchange Act §§ lO(b), 15(c)(l), 48 Stat. 891, 895 (1934), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j, 780 (1958), Rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5 (1949), and Rule
15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2 (1949). Section 15(c)(l) and Rule 15cl-2 apply just to
broker-dealers, while the others apply to "any persons."

102 See discussion, Special Study pt. 3, at 15. More than 400 copies of the Official
Summaries are received by the press, libraries, and other sources of public distribution.
103 This undocumented opinion is based on a review of numerous published Official
Summaries of Holdings and Transactions.
104 Section 16(c) prohibits all short selling by insiders. For discussion of § 16, see
2 Loss, op. cit. supra note 55, at 1037-1132; Painter, The Evolving Role of Section 16(b),
62 MICH. L. REv. 649 (1964). See also Cook &: Feldman, Insider Trading Under the
Securities Exchange Act, 66 HARv. L. REv. 385 (1953).
1011 See testimony of Commissioner Canson Purcell, Hearings Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., 1256-57 (1942). This
theory is somewhat weak in that at common law there was generally no liability to
the corporation unless the purchases were extensive. See BAKER &: CARY, op. cit. supra
note 98, at 535-36. It has been suggested with increasing frequency that the Commission
is the proper party to bring actions under § 16(b).
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Purchases and sales within a six-month period are presumed to
be motivated by inside information. However, if it can be proved
that inside information was used in any transaction, the insider
has violated the fraud provisions of the securities acts and section 16(b) need not be used. The regulations under the fraud
provisions provide that it is unlawful in connection with any purchase or sale in interstate commerce "to make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading." 100 This
restriction nominally applies to any person, but in practice has
been used only against corporate insiders and broker-dealers.107 In
addition to the regular criminal penalties, the courts have permitted private parties to use these sections as the basis for civil
liability.108 In respect to corporate insiders, the affirmative requirement to disclose has been held to extend to anything which
affects the value of the security and which is known to the insider,
but not to the other party. Private recoveries have been obtained
in numerous cases where common-law fraud principles would not
have imposed a duty to disclose. 109
The principal limitation on private sanctions is the immense
problem of establishing a basis for recovery when the transactions
of the insider or the uninformed investor take place on an exchange. The recent Cady, Roberts & Co. case110 makes it clear that
the obligation to disclose applies to exchange transactions. In
this case the party making use of inside information was a brokerdealer, and the sanction was a revocation proceeding by the Commission. The difficulty of determining the extent of damages and
100 17 C.F.R. § 240.l0b-5(2) (1949). Similar language is present in § 17a and Rule
15c·l·2. The anti-fraud provisions also make unlawful any purchase or sale by means
of a scheme to defraud, or any act or practice or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit on customers, or by means of any other manipulative
or fraudulent device.
101 Actions for failure to disclose have been brought only against parties who would
qualify as insiders under § 16 of the Exchange Act. Cady, Roberts &: Co., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961, is the first instance of the expansion of
the duty to one who has obtained information from an insider. See Comment, Insider
Liability Under Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5: The Cady, Roberts Doctrine, 30
U. CHI. L. REV. 121 (1962); 60 MICH. L. REV. 651 (1962).
10s Exchange Act § 32, 48 Stat. 904 (1934), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1958). 3
Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1449 (2d ed. Supp. 1962), cites a total of 14 criminal cases
under lOb-5. For review of the cases involving an implied private remedy, see North,
Implied Civil Liability Cases Under the Federal Securities Laws, Corporate Practice
Commentator, May 1962, p. 1.
109 See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica, 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951). See also the cases
collected in Comment, supra note 107, at 129 nn.45-46, 130 n.47.
110 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6668, Nov. 8, 1961.
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the proper plaintiffs makes doubtful the development of effective
private sanctions for exchange transactions by insiders. 111
The principal protection against the exploitation of inside
information is to obtain immediate and full disclosure from companies. The reporting requirements of the Exchange Act discussed above serve this purpose. In addition, most Exchange rules
require prompt disclosure of any development "which might affect
security values or influence investment decisions of stockholders
or the investing public." 112 Similar rules should be developed for
the over-the-counter market. 113 Section 16 of the Exchange Act,
by requiring disclosure of transactions and the forfeiting of shortswing profits, does aid in preventing the more obvious forms of
abuse, and these provisions should be extended to insiders of overthe-counter companies.114

B. Broker-Dealers
Broker-dealers play many roles, and their duties of disclosure
depend on which is involved. As an underwriter or in selling new
issues, the broker-dealer is acting on behalf of the issuer and under
the Securities Act has the same duty as the issuer to provide a
prospectus to every purchaser during the distribution. If the
broker-dealer is an officer, director, or beneficial owner of ten
percent of any listed security, he must disclose his own transactions.
If he is an insider, or has access to inside information, he is subject
to the disclosure provisions of the fraud regulations. This subsection concerns the disclosures required of broker-dealers acting
111 If privity is required, then there is a difficult problem of tracing shares, and a
basic unfairness in that the plaintiff will be determined by the chance of certificate
distribution in the clearing house. If no privity is required, then any party who has
made a stock transaction during the period the information was withheld is a potential plaintiff. For example, in the Cady, Roberts case the broker, Gintel received
information that Curtiss-Wright reduced its dividend at about 11:00 a.m. on November
25, 1959. The news did not appear on the Dow-Jones ticker until ll:48 a.m. During
the interval Gintel sold about 7,000 shares of Curtiss-Wright. Gintel sold for about $40
a share and the stock closed for the day at about $34 a share. During the following
year the price of Curtiss-Wright stock dropped to a low of $14 a share. Is there a recovery due anyone who purchases shares between ll:00 a.m. and ll:48 a.m. who had
no knowledge of the reduced dividend, or is the recovery to be limited only to the
purchaser who received the actual shares sold by Gintel? If a proper plaintiff is determined how are his damages to be measured? There do not appear to be satisfactory
answers to these questions.
112 NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A20-22. It is reported that the
.American Stock Exchange has a similar policy. See Special Study pt. 3, at 98 n.187.
113 It is reported that since September 1962 the NASD has imposed a similar requirement of prompt disclosure for all companies appearing on the national and regional
retail quotation lists. See id. pt. 2, at 631.
114 These measures are included in the recommendations of the Special Study and
proposed legislation. See note 70 supra.
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other than in the above roles. As mentioned earlier, the brokerdealer is subject to numerous regulations requiring certain conduct
and prohibiting other actions; disclosure, while important, is only
part of his total obligation.115
In most instances, a broker-dealer acts as an agent for a customer in the purchase or sale of securities. Assuming that (1) the
customer approaches the broker without solicitation, (2) cash is
paid and the securities are immediately delivered, and (3) the
· transaction takes place on an exchange, the minimum obligation
of the broker-dealer is to execute the transaction quickly, report
the market price, and collect his disclosed commission.116 The
three assumptions above, however, are vital in determining the
broker-dealer's duties: (1) Brokers are generally salesmen, and as
such they recommend and tout particular securities. In many
instances the broker is acting as an investment adviser for the customer. (2) The relationship of the parties may be more complex.
For example, the broker may act as bailee for securities and cash of
the customer; the broker may have discretion in handling the account of the customer; or the broker may be a creditor of the
customer where securities are held in a margin account. (3) The
security may be purchased not on an exchange, but in the overthe-counter market.
The Special Study reported that less than half the dollar volume of customer purchases in the over-the-counter market are
made through broker-dealers as agents. In the majority of transactions the customer is purchasing from the dealer as a principal.117
This occurs when the selling dealer has the security in his inventory, or when he purchases from another dealer as a principal, then
reselling to his customer.118
Under agency concepts, as the broker-dealer increases his involvement with a customer (as in the first or second circumstances
above), his duties of disclosure increase; but if he acts as a principal
and not an agent he has no duties of disclosure beyond avoidance
See Comment, 62 MICH, L. REv. 680, 730 (1964).
In addition, the broker-dealer has the duties of any agent, such as the obligation
to disclose any personal interest in conflict with interests of his customer. See REsTATEMENT, AGENCY § 23 (1958).
117 In terms of numbers of shares, 61% of th.e purchases were made through brokerdealers as agent. Special Study pt. 2, at 612.
118 In this latter situation the broker-dealer will purchase the security from a wholesaler at the wholesale price and resell to his customer at a "mark-up" over his cost. The
broker-dealer does not confirm the transaction to the customer -until he has purchased
the security. This kind of principal transaction is called "riskless," as the risks of ownership are absent. Id. at 611.
115
116
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of fraud. The basic obligations required of any agent are still
important with respect to broker-dealers, but they have been supplemented from two sources: specific requirements of the Exchange
Act and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, and the development by case decisions of responsibilities based on the status of
broker-dealers.
The specific disclosure obligations found in the Exchange Act
and its accompanying regulations are primarily expressions of
normal agency duties. Their importance is that they apply to
any broker-dealer, even when he is acting as a principal in an
over-the-counter transaction. Regulations under section 15 of
the Exchange Act provide that a broker-dealer must disclose, in
any purchase or sale in the over-the-counter market, whether he
is acting as a broker or as a dealer for his own account.U9 If the
broker-dealer is acting as a broker he must disclose the amount
of commission.120 Other rules require a broker-dealer to make
appropriate disclosure to his customer if he is controlled by or
in a control position of the issuer of any security in which he
is effecting a transaction, 121 and to inform any customer he advises
on securities for a fee of any interest he has in any distribution of
securities concerning which he is advising. 122 There are in addition the general fraud provisions.123
Under these regulations promulgated pursuant to the Exchange
Act, the broker-dealer must disclose to his customer the amount of
his commission if he acts as a broker in the purchase or sale of
over-the-counter securities. In a transaction on an exchange, the
price and amount of commission must also be disclosed. However,
in over-the-counter transactions, where the broker-dealer is acting
as a dealer, only this fact must be disclosed. The dealer has no
duty to disclose his costs or the amount of mark-up he charges his
customer; many times the customer has no way of determining
110 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(4) (1949), applies to over-the-counter transactions. See also
Exchange Act § ll(d)(2), 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78k (1958), which contains a
similar rule for exchange transactions.
120 This is made specific only for over-the-counter transactions. Rule 15c-1(4), 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(4) (1949). The exchanges themselves require disclosure of commissions.
121 Exchange Act Rule 15c-1(5), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(5) (1949).
122 Exchange Act Rule 15c-1(6), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c-1(6) (1949). Other disclosures
are required in specific circumstances. For example, Rule 15c-1(7)(b), 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1(7) (1949), requires recording of transactions in discretionary accounts; Rule 15c-2(1), 17
C.F.R. § 240.15c-2(1) (1949), and Rule Sc-I, 17 C.F.R. § 240.Sc-l (1949), require certain disclosures when customers' securities are hypothecated; and Rule lOb-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-7
(Cum. Supp. 1963), requires disclosure of stabilizing transactions made to facilitate a
distribution.
123 See notes 101 8: 106 supra.
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whether the transaction took place at the current market price.12'
It was to meet this problem that the Commission originally developed the "shingle theory" of broker-dealer obligation. This duty
to customers is not based on the presence of an agency, but on the
professional status of the broker-dealer. When a broker-dealer
"hangs out his shingle" he is said to undertake an obligation to his
customer higher than that of an ordinary salesman.125 This higher
standard is similar to the obligations long imposed on attorneys,
doctors, certified public accountants, and architects in dealing with
their customers.126 Recent cases have applied the same concept
to insurance salesmen by requiring that the insurance be suitable
for the customer, and that the insurance salesman disclose the basis
for his opinion regarding the desirability of the policies recommended.127
In regard to broker-dealers, the shingle theory first took the
form of requiring that the price of securities be reasonably related
to current market value even when the broker-dealer was selling as
a principal; thus an unreasonable mark-up is fraudulent unless
disclosed.128 The shingle theory has since been applied to prohibit
(1) unauthorized transactions in a customer's account,120 (2) unauthorized pledging of a customer's securities,130 (3) the accepting
of a customer's securities without disclosing insolvency,131 and (4)
failure to deliver securities promptly.132 Instead of resting these
duties on an agency basis, the Commission has applied them to all
broker-dealers regardless of the capacity in which they are acting.
While a broker-dealer cannot charge an unreasonable mark-up,
124 Proposed Rule X-15c-1(10) Ouly 29, 1942) would have required dealers to disclose
in all transactions the best independent bid and offer obtainable in the exercise of reasonable diligence. The proposed rule was withdrawn (SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 3940, April 2, 1947) because of pressure from the securities industry and court
approval of the "shingle theory" in Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir.
1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944). See Special Study pt. 2, ch. VII-D for criticism
relating to the lack of customer knowledge about the quality of the markets and the
executions of transactions.
125 "Even considering petitioner as a principal in a simple vendor purchaser transaction ... it was still under a special duty in view of its expert knowledge and proffered advice .•••" Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, supra note 124, at 436-38.
126 See MECHEM, OUTLINES OF AGENCY § 525 (4th ed. 1952).
127 See Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961); Hardt v. Brink, 192 F. Supp.
879 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
12s Charles Hughes &: Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
786 (1944). See also Duker v. Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
129 See, e.g., First Anchorage Corp., 34 S.E.C. 299 (1952).
130 See, e.g., Richard A. Sebastian, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5876,
Feb. 12, 1959.
131 See, e.g., SEC v. C. H. Abraham & Co., 186 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
132 See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6778, April 16, 1962.
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there is still no absolute requirement that the amount of mark-up
be disclosed. 133 Currently the broker-dealer discloses his costs and
profit if he decides to act as broker (agent), but not if he acts as
dealer (principal). This is not a satisfactory situation, and in every
instance the customer should be informed of the amount of markup or commission. The investor always considers his brokerdealer as working for him, and the mechanics of the trading process
should not prevent the investor from receiving the basic information relating to price and costs.134
As the relationship between broker-dealer and customer becomes closer, the obligations of the broker-dealer should increase.
For example, a phenomenon of recent origin is the depositing by
customers of large quantities of fully paid securities and cash with
broker-dealers. These securities are usually in the street name of
a broker-dealer. With few exceptions, broker-dealers make use of
these securities and cash in their normal operations, and no segregation of accounts is maintained. Customer account balances are
a source of free money, as most broker-dealers pay no interest to
customers for its use. As a minimum, a broker-dealer should provide his customer with periodic statements of transactions, including a report of the extent to which the broker-dealer has used
the customer's assets. An explanation of the potential risks in case
of broker-dealer insolvency should also be provided.135
Under the general fraud provisions, a broker-dealer must disclose material facts needed to make a statement not misleading.
The most important current questions concerning broker-dealers
center on what a broker-dealer must disclose beyond what is
required by the fraud provisions. Must a broker-dealer inform a
customer that a particular security is not suitable for his pur133 In Arleen W. Hughes, 27 S.E.C. 629, 952 (1948), the Commission held there was
a positive duty to disclose actual cost and the amount of mark-up. This duty arose
because the broker-dealer was acting as an investment adviser and thus was held to
be in a fiduciary capacity, requiring her to fulfill the obligations of an agent even
though as a broker-dealer she sold as a principal. At one time the Commission went
further and held that "riskless transactions" (see note 118 supra) would be treated as
agency transactions. Oxford Co., 21 S.E.C. 681 (1946). The Commission has not continued to maintain this position.
1s, The Special Study recommendation in this area was that all "riskless transactions"
be handled on an agency basis. Special Study pt. 2, at 676. In addition, the Special Study
urged wider dissemination of wholesale quotations of bid and asked prices, and new NASD
standards relating to the execution of orders and the amount of mark-up.
135 For a general discussion of the handling of customer's accounts and the potential
risks to customers, see id. pt. 1, at 387-416. The recent insolvency of two New York Stock
Exchange Members-Ira Haupt 8: Co. and J. R. Williston 8: Beane-provides an un•
fortunate example of the potential_ danger to investors.
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chase? Must a broker-dealer furnish a current financial statement
to customers for any security he recommends? Must a broker-dealer
reveal the basis or lack of basis for his opinion about a security?
Several recent decisions by the Commission and the courts seem
to answer these questions in the affirmative.136 These obligations
rest on a broker-dealer qua broker-dealer-a duty owed to the
public because of his status. The defining and cataloguing of these
obligations which is currently taking place is the most far-reaching
development in securities regulations since the passage of the
original acts. It is tied to a recognition of the need for increased
professionalism on the part of broker-dealers and the need for
higher broker-dealer qualifications. It is also part of the increased
emphasis on the trading aspects of securities regulation as opposed
to the distribution aspects. The role of disclosure is properly expanding from obligations imposed on the issuers of securities to
obligations imposed on the broker-dealers who deal directly with
the investor.
C. Investment Advisers and Corporate Publicity
Many problems surrounding the giving of investment advice
and the dissemination of corporate publicity were stressed in the
report of the Special Study.137 They involve a variety of special
situations, and the recommendations were primarily directed
toward self-regulatory agencies. 138 Although not articulated as
such, the principal shortcomings involved lack of disclosure. An
investment adviser who holds himself out to the public as an
expert in investment analysis should be held to minimum standards
of competence and performance. The public is entitled to good
faith opinions based on his independent research, or to be informed
136 "There is inherent in the dealer-customer relationship the implied representation
that the customer will be dealt with honestly and fairly and that the representations
respecting a stock which the dealer recommends are reasonably made on the basis of
knowledge and careful consideration." In the Matter of Heft, Kahn &: Infante, Inc., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7020, Feb. 11, 1963. See also Berko v. SEC, 297
F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1961); Herring v. Hendison, 62 Civil No. 1540, S.D.N.Y., May 9, 1963;
MacRobbins &: Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6846, July 11, 1962; In
the Matter of Brown, Barton &: Engel, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 6821,
June 8, 1962; SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, Feb. 2, 1962 (dealing with distribution
of -unregistered securities by broker-dealers).
137 Special Study pt. 1, at 330-87.
138 The exchanges and the NASD were encouraged to establish rules and practices
in respect to broker-dealers who give investment advice, and it was recommended that
registered investment advisers other than broker-dealers be organized into self-regulatory
organizations. Special Study pt. I, at 387. The New York Stock Exchange is reported to
have issued new rules governing member firms' market letters, research reports, and
advertising. The Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1963, p. 9, cols. 2-3.
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that no such research has been performed. For example, an investment adviser should disclose whether he has a personal interest
in a security which he recommends. The customer of the investment adviser needs this information in order properly to weigh
an opinion of the adviser which might be influenced by such a
personal interest.
The registered investment adviser's duty to disclose the fact
that he has taken a position in securities which he recommends
was definitely established by the Supreme Court in its recent
opinion in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc. 139 The opinion discusses at length various views on the role of the investment
adviser, and includes quotations from the Code of Ethics and
Standards of Practice of one of the investment counsel associations.139a The result is a finding of a "fiduciary relationship" between investment adviser and client, and a failure to disclose
potential conflicting financial interests is fraudulent.
"An adviser who, like respondents, secretly trades on the
market effect of his own recommendation, may be motivated
--consciously or unconsciously-to recommend a given security not because of its potential for long-run price increase
(which would profit the client), but because of its potential
for short-run price increase in response to anticipated activity
from the recommendation (which would profit the adviser).
An investor seeking the advice of a registered investment adviser must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to evaluate such overlapping motivations, through
appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving 'two masters' or only one, 'especially . . . if one of the
masters happens to be economic self interest.' " 139b
The language of the opinion gives support to the recent Commission decisions on the positive obligations of broker-dealer, discussed
above, 139c and serves notice that higher standards of conduct based
on the "professional responsibility" of broker-dealers and investment advisers will be expected.
Many investment advisers make use of material furnished by
the corporation recommended. This obviously is an important
source, but if the investment adviser's recommendation is based
only on such data, with no independent checking or analysis, this
deficiency should be disclosed. If an investment adviser wishes
139 84 Sup. Ct. 275 (1963).
130a Id. at 277-85.
189b

Jd. at 285.

1soc See note 136

supra.
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to give recommendations based on astrology, the sticking of pins
into the financial pages, or which company provides him with free
trips to Florida, this probably should be allowed. The basic need
is for the public to be informed of the research techniques used
and the basis of the recommendations. The theoretical justification for imposition of a duty to disclose is the same as that discussed
above-a type of shingle theory. Registration as an investment
adviser imposes a duty to disclose material facts affecting the independence and quality of the advice given.
Although no registration is required of parties other than brokerdealers and those giving investment advice for a fee, 140 there is
a need for disclosure with regard to free investment advice and
financial information in the public press. Considerable concern
was expressed after the revelation by the Special Study that a financial editor of a national magazine had purchased shares immediately prior to the publication of a favorable article concerning the
company.141 The real concern here is not that one individual
made a profit through his position, but that readers of the publication were misled into believing that the story was an unbiased
product. Readers are similarly misled if a story in an independent
publication is planted by a company.142
Difficult questions are involved in placing any restrictions on the
public press. There are also problems in attempting to draw a
line between corporate publicity intended to sell a company's
product, and publicity intended to sell a company's stock. There
is nothing inherently wrong with the latter, and it may be a legitimate corporate endeavor. The public is used to advertising, and
can weigh material which is clearly labeled as advertising. The
need is to insure that corporate publicity intended to advertise
securities is clearly labeled, and is not misleading. The Commission has taken tentative steps regarding corporate publicity intended to affect the price of securities by requiring certain disclosures by companies of the amount of money spent on such
activities. This is of some help, and could be expanded by requiring continuous disclosure of these expenditures in the annual
reports. There may also be a need for a tighter fraud statute
directed against companies which publish misleading information
affecting the price of their securities.143 What is also needed, howInvestment Advisers Act § 3, 54 Stat. 850 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (1958).
See special Study pt. 3, at 73-75.
Cf. 16 C.F.R. § 13.10 (1960), the Federal Trade Commission rule against advertising falsely or misleadingly.
143 See the recommendations of the Special Study pt. 3, at 102.
140
141
142
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ever, is extension of minimum obligations of disclosure to all parties giving investment advice, and to the financial press. The existing fraud provisions should be enforced against these parties,
and any new fraud statute should expressly include them. 144

D. Disclosure of Market Data
Market data includes both daily market information on particular securities (e.g., price and volume of shares traded) and
information which is published in aggregated form for a period
of time (e.g., monthly reports of short positions, monthly odd
lot transactions, monthly customer debit and credit balances, weekly reports of round lot sales). 145 Such data is necessary to enable
the investor to evaluate the market price of particular securities,
as well as the general tone and level of the market. In addition,
disclosures of market data aid in the prevention of manipulation,
for enforcement officials can thus locate and check unusual market
behavior.146
Beyond the general provisions which require broker-dealers
to keep such books and records as the Commission may prescribe,147
there is no specific requirement that broker-dealers furnish market
data. The only direct reference to the reporting of market data
is in connection with exchange rules. The Commission is to register an exchange only upon the finding that it has rules "just and
adequate to insure fair dealing and to protect investors." 148 Specifically, the Commission is given authority to promulgate rules
for an exchange concerning "the reporting of transactions on the
exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with the consent of
the exchange including the method of reporting short sales, stopped
sales, sales of securities of issuers in default, bankruptcy or receiv144 See In the Matter of Carvalho, d/b/a Capital Investment Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7129, Aug. 29, 1963 (broker-dealer held in violation of § I0b-5
Exchange Act for financial public relations activities); SEC v. Chamberlain Associates,
Civil No. 61-2150, S.D.N.Y., May 16, 1963 (Company "Financial Public Relations Counsel"
who had responsibility for passing stock to the public held in violation of § 17(a) of
Securities Act).
H5 Special Study Table VI-91, pt. 2, at 429. The Special Study listed about twenty
reports that are being filed on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis with the New York
Stock Exchange. In almost all instances only aggregate data is published.
HO Some reports, such as floor traders' reports, are designed specifically for surveillance. In other instances, such as the tape-watching program of the exchanges and the
Commission, regulatory purposes are an important by-product. For any market study,
such as that attempted by the Special Study for the period of the market break of 1962,
reported data is indispensable. See Special Study pt. 4, at 815-957.
147 Exchange Act § 17a, 48 Stat. 897 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78q (1958). Reports of stabilizing activities (Rule 17a-2), and an annual report of financial condition (Rule 17a-5,
Form X-17A-5) are required under this section. In addition, broker-dealers must keep
detailed records of transactions and accounts (Rule 17a-3).
HS Exchange Act § 6d, 48 Stat. 885 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78f (1958).
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ership, and sales involving other special circumstances. . . ."149
Currently, the only source of daily market data for individual
stocks are the exchange ticker tapes and the clearing house reports.
The Special Study criticized exchange reporting as neither providing an accurate measure of volume nor enabling the checking of individual transactions. 150 The reconstruction of the trading
even in a single stock for one day is almost impossible. Tape data
is incomplete, for certain trades of specialists are not included, and
there is no way to identify individual firms which are participating,
or whether sales are long or short. There is no way to determine
the actual time of a transaction; 151 at best, only a sequence is possible, and as activity increases, accuracy decreases. Individual transactions must be traced through the clearing house data, which is a
difficult and time-consuming task.152
The Special Study recommended that the exchanges attempt
to improve the accuracy and coverage of their reporting of market
transactions, and suggested that the reporting be done at the point
of execution by each member. 153 This is a sound approach. Current electronic data processing equipment can easily digest the
information coming from the individual broker. If all trades were
recorded, it would be possible to trace an order back to its source
and to determine price, time, and identification of the investor.
Broker-dealers already maintain records of transactions, and the
obligation to report individual transactions can be justified as part
of their general duty as licensed broker-dealers.154
The reporting of general market data currently provided by
weekly and monthly reports could also be improved. Better integration of these reports is needed, and important additions should
Exchange Act § 19b(8), 48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1958).
Special Study pt. 2, at 351-58. See also id. pt. 4, at 815-957. The reconstruction of
the market break data involved months of work and hours of computer time. Even with
this, it represented only an estimate.
151 Only secondary sources are available, and these are not complete or consistent.
In order to identify participants, clearing house data must be used; to determine the
time of each transaction the exchange uses odd-lot records. These records show tape
time, which makes them difficult to integrate with the specialists' reports, which show
actual time. See id. pt. 2, at 355-56.
152 Clearing house data originates from members' reports of transactions which are
cleared, and there is no requirement that all transactions go through the clearinghouse.
Ibid.
153 Id. at 357-58.
154 Direct reporting of transactions would involve more record keeping for floor
members and new procedures for reporting for all broker-dealers. These added duties
are justified under the Exchange Act as being "necessary or appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair dealing in securities traded upon such exchange••••"
48 Stat. 898 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78s (1958). The duties to report market data could also
be justified under the "shingle theory."
149

150
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be made to the material reported. 155 In certain technical areas,
such as trading by members and specialist activities, more comprehensive and detailed reports are needed. 156
While improvements are needed in the reporting of transactions on exchange markets, a whole new system of reporting
should be considered for the over-the-counter market. There are
no records of volume or price of trades in particular securities.
There are no regular reports of general market data. The public
has, at best, retail quotations which do not represent actual transactions, but are only "a guide to the range within which these
securities could have been sold or bought at the time of computation."157 As discussed above, in many instances an investor cannot
determine market value, and it is impossible to judge the quality
or depth of any particular market. 158
The problem of obtaining market data in the over-the-counter
market is complex. Pursuant to recommendations of the Special
Study, the Commission and the NASD are currently working to
develop an improved system for quotations.159 This is an important step, but an immediate effort should also be directed toward the broader goal. The individual broker-dealer should report not only quotations, but also the details of each transaction.
Modern electronic data processing equipment makes possible a
reporting system for over-the-counter transactions that could equal
that of the major exchanges.
155 There is need to coordinate the filing of reports, and to reduce the time lag
between the time of filing and publication. Specific recommendations in respect to reports of members' trading and specialists' activities were made in Special Study pt. 2, at
162-70, 238-42, 246.
156 A related problem of disclosure involves the specialist's book. The book contains
the accumulation of market and limit orders for purchases and sales. The orders usually
have time limits as well as price limits. Section 11 of the Exchange Act forbids the
specialist to disclose the contents of his book to a limited number of people because
knowledge of its contents gives a competitive advantage, 48 Stat. 891 (1934), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78k (1958). There is no statutory restriction, however, preventing disclosure to all
members of the exchange and to the public. The Special Study discussed the problem
(pt. 2, at 71-78) but did not satisfactorily answer the question of why full publicity should
not be given to orders in the hands of the specialist if the desire is for a free and open
market. The need for the specialist to keep his book private has not been shown, and
unless such a showing is made, steps should be taken to make use of improved methods
of communication in order to disclose pending orders fully.
157 This caption is required by the NASD to be placed above retail quotations
published by the press.
158 The problems of market data in the over-the-counter market include the difficulties of the investor in determining the broker-dealers cost and mark-up. See Part
IV(C) supra. Currently, the investor does not even have data showing the number of
broker-dealers willing to trade a particular security, as the wholesale quotations are not
generally available. See the discussion in the Special Study pt. 2, at 533-796, particularly
630-58.
1110 See Special Study pt. 2, at 590-609.
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CONCLUSION

Disclosure has now been used as a method of federal regulation of securities in the United States for thirty years, and any
broad statement of evaluation must proclaim its success. This
general accolade must be tempered, however, by a recognition
that the effectiveness of disclosure as a method of regulation depends on the specific situation in which it is used. With respect
to initial distributions, current disclosure requirements are invaluable. They have not, however, prevented investors from
losing money in the purchase of new securities. Investor losses during the speculative activity of 1959 to 1962 were great. Improvements in disclosure mechanics are needed, but even with improvements, losses will probably continue. High-pressure salesmen and
questionable tactics of various underwriters and promoters cannot be prevented by disclosure.
Disclosures by listed companies provide an indispensable
reservoir of information. Disclosure plays its most effective role
by permitting investors to evaluate securities on their merits. This
is also the area where the need for improvement is most pressing.
Reporting requirements should be extended to companies with
securities traded over-the-counter, and the standards and accounting practices used in preparing periodic reports should be improved and standardized. In addition, there is a need to integrate
the reporting requirements of the Securities Acts and the Exchange
Act to avoid the duplication of filed information. This would decrease the burden on both the companies and the Commission.
The increased use of disclosure as a method of regulation of
broker-dealers and other participants in the securities markets
is an important recent development. New obligations owed toward investors are in a period of rapid growth. These obligations do not rest on a formal agency or contract relationship, but
arise because of the "professional" status of the broker-dealer.
Direct restrictions play a part in these obligations, but the recent
developments primarily involve new duties of disclosure which
should be encouraged and developed by the Commission.
These concluding statements summarize the preceding evaluation of the role of disclosure in securities regulation. It is a
role of unparalleled importance. To complete the picture, however, mention must be made of a by-product of corporate disclosure. This is the role of disclosure as a method of regulation of the
internal affairs of a corporation.
During the past thirty years, there has been increasing con-
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cern over the power and influence of the large publicly owned
corporation.160 It is frequently stated that the large corporation
has an obligation not only to its shareholders, but also to its employees, its consumers, and the community in which it operates.161
The officers and directors of large corporations have been compared to public officials, and numerous writers have expressed
concern as to how best to enforce these broad responsibilities of
corporate management. 162 The subject is too broad for this paper,
but any evaluation of disclosure in securities regulation must
acknowledge that the disclosures required by the securities acts
enable employees, consumers, and the general public to obtain
information and thus exercise pressure on corporate behavior.
For example, the amount executives pay themselves in compensation is of interest to labor groups and the general community, as
well as investors. The required disclosure of this compensation
certainly influences the level paid.163 Likewise, the required disclosure of possible conflicts of interest by officers and directors
serves to prevent their occurrence. Mr. Justice Frankfurter described this role of disclosure as follows:
"The existence of bonuses, of excessive commissions and
salaries, of preferential lists and the like, may be all open
secrets among the knowing, but the knowing are few. There
is a shrinking quality to such transactions; to force the knowledge of them into the open is largely to restrain their happening. Many practices safely pursued in private lose their
justification in public. Thus social standards newly defined
gradually established themselves as new business habits." 164
One unanswered question, however, is whether the securities
laws can be properly used to force additional corporate disclosures
160 BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MoNEY (1914), raised the question, but modern discussions usually start with BERLE &: MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932), and Temporary National Economic Committee, Final Report and Recommendations, S. Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941).
161 See BAKER, DIRECTORS AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 138 (1945). Note the similar statements of director responsibilities taken from annual reports of large corporations quoted
in BAKJ:R &: CARY, CORPORATIONS 163 (3d ed. 1959).
162 A good summary of recent material is in Manne, Current Views on the Modern
Corporation, 38 U. DET. L.J. 559 (1961).
163 "It is the salaries of a few top corporate executives as much as anything else
that confirms the worker in his opposition to profit as 'exploitation' and in his conviction that profits must be exorbitant. Every study shows that far from being petty, this
resentment is a major factor in industrial conflict." DRUCKER, THE NEW SOCIETY 92-94,
251 (1950). On the effect of disclosure on executive compensation, see I WASHINGTON
&: ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE 27-28 (3d ed. 1962).
164' The quotation appears in an excellent discussion on the value of expanded disclosure in Cary, The Case for Higher Corporate Standards, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct.
1962, p. 53.
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which may be in the public interest, yet which cannot be justified as necessary for the protection of investors.
The Commission may require a corporation, as a requisite
for listing on an exchange, to disclose such information "as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors...." 165 The Commission may also require information
in periodic reports "as necessary or appropriate for the proper
protection of investors and to insure fair dealing in the securities"166 and may prescribe the content of proxy statements "as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors."167 Is the different language used in these sections intentional? For example, would it be proper for the Commission to require that every proxy statement for an annual
meeting list the number of Negro employees? This information
might be important to the community in order for it to judge
whether the company is meeting its responsibilities toward ending discrimination, yet it could be argued that it is not information needed to protect investors.
Aside from corporate and securities areas, disclosure as a
method of regulation is receiving increasing recognition. It is
seen as a means of preventing conflicts of interest involving government employees,168 and as the remedy for deceptive packaging169 and hidden costs in borrowing money.170 Disclosure is not
an effective regulatory device in all circumstances and, as evidenced by recent attempts to force organizations such as the
NAACP to disclose membership lists, cannot be used indiscriminately.171 In the area of securities regulation, it has proved its value.
As a method of regulation of corporate behavior, disclosure offers
the best available means of achieving desired results without the
restrictiveness of direct regulatory control. To be effective, however, disclosure requirements should be specifically imposed as
needed for corporate regulation. Disclosure for this purpose
should not be limited merely to the by-products of that required
for securities regulation.
165 Exchange Act § 12b(l), 48 Stat. 892 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1958).
166 Exchange Act § 13a, 48 Stat. 894 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1958).
167 Exchange Act § 14d, 48 Stat. 895 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1958).
168 See PREVENTING CONFLICTS OF INTEREST ON THE PART OF SPECIAL

GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (1963). The Case-Neuberger bill (entitled: a bill to promote public confidence
in the integrity of Congress and the executive branch) calls for financial disclosures by
congressmen and members of the executive branch. S.1261, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
169 S. 387, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
170 S. 758, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
171 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960). See also Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60 (1960). For a discussion of limitations of disclosure as a regulatory device, see Com•
ment, Disclosure as a Legislative Device, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1273 (1963).

